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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20040595-CA 
RICHARD KENNETH LAMBETH, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to a third degree felony, 
possession of a controlled substance, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 and 
disorderly conduct a class C misdemeanor. The Defendant pled guilty on May 
17, 2004 and was sentenced to a term of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison on 
June 21, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISORDERLY 
CONDUCT, THUS GIVING THE OFFICERS PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO ARREST AND SEARCH THE DEFENDANT? 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of fact and law. The trial 
court's legal conclusions should be reviewed for correctness, according no 
deference to the trial court's conclusion. The trial court's findings of fact should 
be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. "[Q]uestions of law 
are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed 
only if clearly erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). This 
issue was preserved for appeal when the Defendant entered a conditional plea of 
guilty pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). (R. 
070/2-4). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
First Amendment 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Utah Constitution 
Article 1 Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
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Utah Code Annotated 
§58-37-8- Utah controlled substances act 
(1) Prohibited acts A ~ Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
§76-9-102 Disorderly conduct. 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move from a 
public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, 
by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard in a 
public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to which 
the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes but is not 
limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, 
apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after 
a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(2002) - Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: (e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital 
felony; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with count 1, possession of a 
controlled substance within a drug free zone, a second degree felony and count 2, 
disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor. (R. 003-004). On December 29, 
2003, the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing. (R. 017). His trial attorney 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence. (021-030). The State objected to the 
motion. (R. 0334-038). A hearing was held on February 24, 2004. The trial 
judge denied the Defendant's motion to suppress. (R. 039-041). Written findings 
of fact and conclusions were signed on March 2, 2004. (R. 042-044). On May 
17, 2004 the Defendant entered a "Sery" plea to possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, and disorderly conduct a class C misdemeanor. 
(R. 051-052). The Defendant was sentenced on June 21, 2004 to an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. A sentence, 
judgment and commitment was signed on that same day. (R. 054-55). The 
Defendant filed a notice to appeal on July 15, 2004. (R. 058-059). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 18, 2003, at approximately 3:45 p.m., the Defendant was at a 
7-11 in Ogden putting gas into his car. (R. 069/13, 18). Sergeant McAllister and 
Detective Hanson were at the same 7-11. As they were walking in to the 7-11, 
they heard someone yell "fucking pigs." (R. 069/6-7). The officers recognized 
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the Defendant as the person who yelled at them. They knew the Defendant from 
prior dealings with him. (R. 069/6-7). The Defendant was near the gas pumps 
putting gas in a car. (R. 069/13) There was a lady nearby who was putting gas in 
a van. There were several children in the van. (R. 069/8). 
Sergeant McAllister initially ignored the Defendant. (R. 069/9). The 
Defendant then yelled in an "extremely loud" voice "suck my dick." (R. 069/9). 
The woman who was at the gas pumps hurriedly got in her van and drove away. 
(R. 069/9). Sergeant McAllister said, "Richard, you better stop." (R. 069/9). 
The Defendant yelled "fuck." (R. 069/10-11). There were two ladies walking out 
of the 7-11 when this occurred. (R. 069/10-11). 
Sergeant McAllister began walking towards the Defendant. (R. 069/12). 
He also radioed two officers who were nearby and asked them to come to the 7-
11. (R. 069/12). When the officers arrived Sergeant McAllister told them to 
place the Defendant under arrest. (R. 069/17). The Defendant was arrested for 
disorderly conduct. During the subsequent search incident to arrest, two baggies 
with methamphetamine residue were found on his person. (R. 070/4-5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbids a state from 
punishing the use of words or language that is not within "narrowly limited 
classes of speech." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
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The Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct after he yelled at police 
officers "fucking pigs," "suck my dick," and "fuck." After the Defendant was 
placed under arrest he was searched. Two baggies which contained 
methamphetamine residue were found on his person. 
The Defendant was arrested for using language that is constitutionally 
protected. Since, the Defendant didn't commit an offense, the officers didn't 
have probable cause to arrest him. Therefore, the officers had no justifiable basis 
to search him. The contraband which was found on his person should have been 
suppressed by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISORDERLY 
CONDUCT, THUS GIVING THE OFFICERS PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO ARREST AND SEARCH THE DEFENDANT. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as 
Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant 
part: 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." The 
Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a seizure is 
unreasonable. 
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In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) the Utah Supreme Court 
defined its long-standing position on permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, 
the Court defined these levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a 
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-
coercive questioning by an officer. Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a 
Fourth Amendment seizure, probable cause is not required. Rather, 
when "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences . . . give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime," 
an officer may initiate an investigative detention without consent. 
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been 
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] 
requires probable cause." A level three encounter is also a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. 
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). There is no question that in the case at bar, 
the encounter quickly escalated to a level three encounter once the officers 
decided to arrest the Defendant. The search incident to arrest was a continuation 
of that level three encounter. Under both federal and state constitutional law, the 
police must have "probable cause" that an offense occurred. In the present case 
there was no offense, and therefore no probable cause. 
In making the determination that no offense occurred, this court should be 
guided by its decision in Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1990). In Huber, this Court overruled a conviction for disorderly conduct 
because the Logan City disorderly conduct ordinance infringed upon 
constitutionally protected speech. The relevant portion of that ordinance is as 
follows: 
Intending to cause public inconvenience, noise, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof: 
(D) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes obscene 
gestures in a public place. 
Id. at 1374. This Court reversed the defendant's conviction "because Logan City 
ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) is susceptible of application to substantial amount of 
speech which, though perhaps vulgar or insulting, are nonetheless protected, it is 
constitutionally overbroad and facially invalid." Id. at 1377 
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that the type of speech 
for which the defendant was arrested for in this case is constitutionally protected. 
In Cohen v. California, 403 US 151 (1971) the Supreme Court was presented 
with a factual situation as follows: 
On April 26, 1968, the defendant was observed in the Los Angeles 
County Courthouse in the corridor outside of division on the of the 
municipal court wearing the jacket bearing the words "fuck the 
draft" which were plainly visible. There were women and children 
present in the corridor. The defendant was arrested. The defendant 
testified that he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the 
jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feeling 
against the Vietnam War and the draft. 
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Id. at 16. Based on these facts, the defendant was charged with a violation of 
California Penal Code §415 which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturbing 
the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct." 
Id. at 15. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction on the grounds 
that the statute under which he was convicted violated the defendant's 
constitutional rights. The Court specifically addressed the use of the word "fuck" 
which is arguably the most "offensive" of the terms used by the defendant in the 
present case. Regarding the governments prospective prohibition of that term by 
statute, the Court stated: 
Against this perception of the constitutional policies involved, we 
discern certain more particularized considerations that peculiarly call 
for reversal of this conviction. First, the principle contended for by 
the State seems inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish this 
from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right to 
cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable 
to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable 
general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to 
affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-letter word 
being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of 
its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is 
another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental 
officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the 
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the 
individual... Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the 
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also 
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, 
governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular 
words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular 
views. We have been able, as noted above, to discern little social 
benefit that might result from running the risk of opening the door to 
such grave results. 
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Id. at 26-27. In applying these cases to the case at bar, the result is obvious. The 
words used in the present case are identical to those uttered or written in the 
above-cited cases. The fact that women or children may have heard these 
utterances was a fact that presented itself in the Cohen decision. The Supreme 
Court stated that "the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers 
does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving 
offense." Id. at 21. The Supreme Court also stated that "we have at the same 
time consistently stressed that 'we are often captives outside the sanctuary of the 
home and subject to objectionable speech.' The ability of government, . . . to 
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, 
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in 
an essentially intolerable manner." Id. 
In the case at bar, the trial judge found that the Defendant made three 
statements. These statements were, (1) Fucking pigs; (2) Suck my dick; and (3) 
Fuck. (R. 043-044) 
The trial court found that two ladies walking out of the 7-11 "appeared to 
be disturbed by the Defendant's conduct." (R. 043). Sergeant McAllister was the 
only witness who testified at the suppression hearing. He testified that "their eyes 
got kind of wide and they kind of were hesitant to come out because they were 
like, you know, what's going on out here type thing." (R. 069/11). 
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!
 children in the nearby 
vicinity of the Defendant were justifiably alarmed by the Defendant's conduct." 
(R. 043). This factual finding is clearly erroneous as there was no evidence 
presented to support this. Again, Sergeant McAllister was the only witness who 
t e s t i ti< 1 J ' ' I n ||||i >i " i ( »» li» m | | 1 I l i I »< I i » » ' In HI i 11 in I 111 mi I in I I l i i 11 11 ii 
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 :
 !.*-%" ~"-r T.!.V - i.1 *\ ho wore in the van even 
heard the Defendant. There was no conclusive evidence that the lady was 
alarmed. Sergeant McAllister testified that "I saw her and she looked at him and 
she was like • - Y^ ' Vnov her eyes got big and .-no seemed - Murry ana l.a.^i 
pumping her ga^  
\ ii->r rvfi-i ' •' . i :::k i i p ft z\ ;: ," ,6she 1 ii n i ied ai id got in ai i :i drov e 
away. *
 A assumed it was to get herself and her kids away from him." (R. 
069/10), Typically, when someone finishes pumping their gas they get in their 
car and drive away It's also impossible to hurry the pumping ot ga- ie gas 
pump i mint >l \ ilu >|iet'ii
 ( MI a >MIIII|MIUII iliai J'ii J.UI ill liti uu ami dna\ c a^ a > 
'^ •' - • ^ ' '•' -' ' " Defendar • -.nidence that she was 
alarmed by the Defendant's conduct. Furthermore, since she wasn't called as a 
witness or spoken to, we don't know if she even finds those words offensive. 
The trial court found uur- =•*. Defendant \u-JI^U UK .-I-XI^M 
disorderly conduct statute .. . iv 
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inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created a risk thereof (ii) made 
unreasonable noises in a public place." (R. 044). 
It is clear from this ruling, that the Defendant's conduct that violated the 
statute was that he made "unreasonable noises in a public place." The Court 
found that it wasn't the profanity, but the "manner and tone in which he said the 
statements that triggered the statute." (R. 044). 
Sergeant McAllister testified that Defendant made these statements in a 
loud voice. (R. 069/8, 11). Sergeant McAllister acknowledged that Defendant 
didn't have any weapons, he didn't approach the officers, and he didn't act 
aggressively. (R. 069/16). 
The Defendant was arrested for yelling obscenities at the police officers. 
Under the trial court's ruling, yelling an obscenity is an "unreasonable noise." 
Notwithstanding the trial court's findings, it is clear that he was arrested for what 
he said. It's difficult to believe that the Defendant would have been arrested for 
disorderly conduct had he been reciting the pledge of allegiance in a loud voice or 
yelling "fuck Osama bin Laden". It was the content of the Defendant's speech 
that caused the officers to place him under arrest. 
The disorderly conduct statute found in U.C.A. §76-9-102(2003) is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague both on its face and as it was applied to 
the Defendant. This statute is overbroad because it fails to define what an 
12 
"Stati it : i ] language is c ' erbroad if its lai lgi lage 
proscribes both harmful and innocuous behavior. Stated another way, a statute is 
overbroad if it attempts to sanction constitutionally protected activities." Elk 
Lodges #719 #2021 v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 I 2c1 I 189 
! . • • • • 
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construe statutes so as to carry out legislative intent while avoiding constitutional 
defects (See, Ln Re a Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988), this 
Court should not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in order to reach a 
constitutional construction. Logan C ity v. 1 i ube ? 786 I '" 2d at 13 7 / I c 1 I :>I.c! tl iat 
is i iat i : ' b • :::i: afted :)i il :1 gi ' e tl it s go^ ' ei i n i lei it 
the ability to arrest and punish citizens for voicing dissenting oi unpopular 
opinions. 
As it was applied to the Defendant, the "unreasonable noises" provision of 
the disorder, v >,*, ;.... v^u*.,. infringed upoi. ::. 
them so he was arrested. While the Defendant's words may have been annoying 
and certainly lacked civility, he has a right to express his dislike of the police in a 
vulgar and insulting tone. See, Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d at 1377. Under 
this statute, a student at Utah \ u.;e\ Mai^ v. v,.ic^c \M^ \ e . . , u a u Moore is 
13 
right" would be subject to arrest and prosecution since the majority of the people 
in that community find that speech to be objectionable. 
This case is very similar to Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). In Huber, the defendant used the phrases, "Fuck you," 'This is 
bullshit," and "You guys are harassing me, you piss me right off." Id. at 1373. 
The Defendant made these statements in a loud voice. Id. He also said, "Get 
your fuckin' light out of my car, goddamit. You guys piss me right off." Id. at 
1374. 
The defendant was eventually placed under arrest for disorderly conduct 
under a Logan City ordinance that read a person was guilty of disorderly conduct 
if, [i]ntending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly 
creating a risk thereof: . . . . 
(D) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes obscene gestures 
in a public place[.] 
Id. This Court stated that "[i]t is apparent that the challenged subsection of the 
Logan City ordinance criminalizes speech, i.e., obscene or abusive language 
spoken with the requisite intent." Id. This Court went on to state that "[t]he 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech do not permit the government to 
punish the use of words or language outside of 'narrowly limited classes of 
speech.'" Id. (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972)). 
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punishes as disorderly conduct a significant amount of protected verbal 
expression, including criticism and challenge, vulgarities and remonstrations, 
whether it is directed at a police officer, an ordinary citizen, or one who is not 
even present, \ v itl i : -\ it i egai d fc i its lil :: z Ill) i i :i if: >a : t • : i 1 at 13 a ::ti lal addressee ' ' " > / at 
1 37- :>. 
The Logan City ordinance was overbroad because it conferred "virtually 
unrestrained power on police to arrest and charge persons with a violation 
This type of expansive, content-based ordinance restricting speech 'tend> ^ be 
invoked only where there . • * ^ 
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 130 (1974)). 
The disorderly conduct statute found in !\C.A. § 76-9-102 is not narrowly 
or carefully drawn. Furthermore, it infringes on protected speed c disorderly 
conduct
 o r(im a n Ce it 1 1 i ul >e / v as sii 1 iilai It : t l 1 s ::i 11 1 ei it state statii ite B> ;: tl 1 stati it z s 
• .:••- ' ' • •uence. annoyance, or 
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof." The difference in the statutes was 
that Logan's ordinance read "he engages in abusive or obscene language or 
makes obscene gestures in a public place," while the state statute reads "makes 
unreasonable noises in a pur... , . .^J." 
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The statute fails to define what an unreasonable noise is. What is clear, 
however, is that it criminalizes speech. This broad provision "confers virtually 
unrestrained power on police to arrest and charge persons with a violation." 
Huber, at 1376. This type of statute restricting speech "tends to be invoked only 
where there is no other valid basis for arresting an objectionable or suspicious 
person. The opportunity for abuse . . . is self-evident." Lewis v. City of New 
Orleans, 415 U.S. at 136. In this case, the Defendant was someone the officers 
recognized and knew by name. Sergeant McAllister had been involved in a 
previous arrest of the Defendant. (R. 069/18). 
In Huber, this Court held that "[b]ecause Logan City Ordinance 12-8-
9(2)(D) is susceptible of application to substantial amounts of speech which, 
though perhaps vulgar or insulting, are nonetheless protected, it is constitutionally 
overbroad and facially invalid." 
In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987), the Supreme Court 
stated "the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and 
challenge directed at police officers." In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 
(1949), the Supreme Court stated "[s]peech is often provocative and challenging . 
. . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless 
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil 
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest." 
16 
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words, and certain language that incites." Huber, at 1375. ilic Defendant's 
statements do not fit into any of the above categories. Fighting words are words 
that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate bread r 
the peace. 
utterance do not inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace. 
Furthermore, it i> expected that police officers are expected to "exercise a higher 
degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond 
belligerenti) - .ignting w 01 ds.r" C it) ; \j 1 i < luston v J i it I , l 182 ! J.S. at 1 62 
IVfn 11111111 11 si'd ai e 1 :i : t "*' Dbscene " Ii 1 C h • 1 v C 1 7/ fof ni - ", 
the Supreme Court addressed the word "fuck." The Court stated "[t]his is not. . . 
an obscenity case. Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to ;he States' 
broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some 
significant way, en . . . _ ....;.».„ .< 
anyone likely to be confronted \\ itli Cohen's crudely defaced jacket." Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. at 20. 
Since the Defendant's conduct was constitutionally protected, he did not 
commit a criminal offense and 1110 officers c * , . >ave probable cause to at1est 
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him. Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally 
impermissible seizure of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this 
constitutional violation affect the evidence that was found during the search 
incident to arrest. In the case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 
(1963) the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "[t]he exclusionary rule has traditionally 
barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct 
result of an unlawful invasion." 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. In State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) this 
Court held: 
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to 
exclude 'all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation 
of the Constitution.' Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691. There 
is no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie Fork Canyon 
traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there any dispute that, 
absent the good faith exception, all evidence obtained subsequent to 
defendant's stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous 
tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 
407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
If the Defendant didn't commit an offense, then the officers had no legal 
basis to justify a warrantless search and the exclusionary rule would apply. In 
State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185 (Utah C. App. 2004), this Court stated, '[a]s officer 
must have probable cause . . . to believe that the suspect has committed or is 
committing an offense." Id. at 188 (citations and quotations omitted). Since it is 
18 
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probable cause that the Defendant had commit ted disorderly conduct. Probable 
cause determinations are reviewed under an "objective standard: whether from 
the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly ; drawn 
arrested." Id. at 189(alterations in original)(citations and quotations omitted). 
Logan City v. Ruber was decided by this Court in 1990 The Supreme 
Court decided Cohen v. California in }°n], Gooding v. Wilson in 1972, and City7 
of 1 louston v I i1 'ill in: i 198 / C -^ ..: ; .* .^ :s.ig s p e e d l, in I ::li I dii lg fc i ill. language 
tc)11 '^ ' ai :1s police officei s. , sti et :!: * ]- ! : s " i easonabl) ob jecti ,j e 
police officer should understand fundamental constitutional law and recognize 
that the Defendant ' s speech is constitutionally protected. 
Since the Defendant d idn ' t violate the law, the r-ffir.—q die1 not have 
probable cause to arrest ; . ontrabai .. 
court. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the trial cour t ' s denial of his motion to suppress. 
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CONCLUSION 
Freedom of speech is one of this country's most cherished principles. Both 
the federal and Utah State appellate courts have repeatedly upheld a citizen's 
right to express themselves, even when the expression is distasteful to large 
segments of society. "The constitutional right of free expression is powerful 
medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours." Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 24 (1971). Furthermore the First Amendment "protects a significant 
amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers." Houston v. 
Hill, 482 U.S. at 461. Even if the speech is challenging or offensive, it is 
protected "against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a 
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. at 4. 
While the Defendant's conduct may have been annoying and his words 
could have been more artfully crafted, his right to express his displeasure towards 
the police officers is protected by the First Amendment. 
Sergeant McAllister acknowledged that the Defendant didn't have any 
weapons, didn't act aggressively and didn't approach the officer. There was 
nothing in the Defendant's speech that produced " a clear and present danger of a 
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or 
20 
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suppress should be reversed. 
DATED this \V day of October, 2004. 
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ADDENDUM A 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD KENNETH LAMBETH, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031906457 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: June 21, 2 004 J^ 
*3 
*Oo4 
PRESENT 
Clerk: dianew 
Prosecutor: L. DEAN SAUNDERS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEVE LAKER (PDA) 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 21, 1970 
Video 
Tape Number: D062104 Tape Count: 310 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/17/2004 Guilty 
2. DISORDERLY CONDUCT - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/17/2004 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is before the Court for sentencing. Defendant 
present in custody from the Weber County Jail. 
3rd Degree 
Page 1 054 
Case No: 031906457 
Date: Jun 21, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Defendant is granted credit for all time served. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISORDERLY CONDUCT a Class C 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 90 day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Jail term may be served at the prison. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Jail term imposed to run concurrently with prison term imposed. 
Page 2 
Case No: 031906457 
Date: Jun 21, 2004 
Dated this jT^J day of 
ROGER S7 DUTSOtf" 
District Court Judge 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE CLERK: Kenneth Lambeth, case number 031906457. 
Time set for suppression hearing. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, the State (unintelligible). 
MR. BOUWHUIS: All right. 
(Mr. Lambeth enters the courtroom.) 
CHRIS MCALLISTER, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. Please state your name and occupation. 
A. Chris McAllister. Ogden Police Department. 
Q. Sergeant — 
THE COURT: Could I get you to lean up a little bit? 
That doesn't pick up very well. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) Sergeant McAllister, how long have you 
worked for the Ogden City Police Department? 
A. Just over 18 years. 
Q. And what's your current assignment? 
A. I'm sergeant over the Ogden Weber Metro Gang Unit. 
Q. How long have you been a sergeant? 
A. Two years. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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Q. Okay. 
A. In the gang unit two years. 
Q. And as a sergeant, you've been a sergeant for two years? 
A. I've been a sergeant for five years. 
Q. Okay. On December 18th of 2003, did you go to the 7-11 
in Ogden City up on Monroe? 
A. I did. 
Q. Where is that 7-11 located? 
A. The address is 803 24th Street. 
Q. Okay. 
A. On the corner of 24th and Monroe. 
Q. Sergeant McAllister, will you diagram for us this area 
that we're talking about? 
A. (Witness leaves stand to draw diagram.) (Unintelligible) 
Q. Okay. The 7-11 is on where, Monroe Boulevard and 24th 
Street? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. And the box in the middle is the 7-11 then? 
A. That's the building itself. 
Q. Okay. And what is the sort of rectangular item? 
A. That's where the gas pumps are located. 
Q. Okay. (Unintelligible) 
And when you came to 7-11, where did you park? 
A. There's a guardrail that runs north and south on the east 
side of the building. And I parked in that general area. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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Q. Okay. Were you with anybody at the time? 
A. I was meeting Detective Hanson there. 
Q. Okay. And so was Detective Hanson driving with you or he 
was in a separate car? 
A. No. We were in separate cars. 
Q. Where did Detective Hanson park? 
A. Same place. 
Q. Okay. And what did the two of you decide that you were 
going to do? 
A. We were going to walk in the 7-11 and get a drink. 
Q. Okay. Very official police business. 
A. Maybe some donuts. 
Q. Okay. Did the two of you then get out of the car and go 
into 7-11? 
A. We did. He got out and I got out, and just as I was 
stepping over this guard railing -- because itfs about two 
feet high -- I was stepping over it and I heard something 
from this area. 
Q. Okay. And when you say something from this area, did you 
hear a voice? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you recognize that voice? 
A. No. Not at the time. 
Q. Okay. Where was the individual standing at? 
A. He was standing in this general area. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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Q. Okay. 
A. Right 
Q. Okay. 
A. Well, 
Q. Okay. 
A. Right 
Near the pumps. J 
by -- by them, yeah. 
On the north side of the pumps? 
this is covered. J 
(Unintelligible) awning. 
An awning. And he was just in the central part 
of the (unintelligible) area. J 
Q. Okay. 
you hear? 
A. I hea 
Q. Okay. 
ask you, < 
at you? 
A. Yeah. 
And originally when you heard something, what did 
rd someone yell, fucking pigs. 
What's the distance between where -- well, let me 
did you determine who it was that was yelling this 
I turned and looked and saw Richard Lambeth 
looking at us. Just yelled it. 
Q. Okay. So did you recognize Mr. Lambeth? 
A. I did. 
Q. How did you recognize him? 
A. Well, Detective Hanson said, that's Richard Lambeth, 
isn't it? 
And I said, yeah, it is (unintelligible). I didn't 
recognize -- I didn't realize it was Richard until he said, 
that's Richard Lambeth. 
And I said, yeah, (unintelligible). 
Q. Okay. So the two of you recognize Richard Lambeth then, 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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the defendant in this case. ! 
A. That's correct. 
Q. How did you recognize the defendant? 
A. I've been in contact with Mr. Lambeth on several 
different occasions. 
THE DEFENDANT: Harassing me. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) Okay. All right. So while he's here 
and you are here, what's the distance between the pumps 
versus where you're at trying to step over the -- the cement 
barrier? 
A. From there to there is probably 60, 70 feet. 
Q. Okay. Give us an idea in terms of this courtroom. How 
far is it in this courtroom? 
A. Well, it would be from about here out the doors, over to 
the center of that round circle. 
Q. Okay. So from here to where the railing is, essentially, 
out in the hallway? 
A. Approximately. 
Q. All right. And so from that distance you could hear what 
the defendant was saying? 
A. I could hear he was -- it was yelling. It was extremely 
loud. 
Q. Okay. And what did he yell? 
A. He yelled, fucking pigs. 
Q. Okay. And he yelled it from here to here and you were 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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able to hear him? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did you have any difficulty in hearing what he was I 
saying? 
A. No. 
Q. I mean, obviously, you didn't have anything to measure 
the — the level of how loud it was. 
A. No. 
Q. But from where you were standing, if you're here and he's 
over there by the railing, does it still sound like yelling 
or does it just sound like talking like we're doing here 
today? 
A. No. It was yelling. 
Q. Okay. And is that what caught your attention and why you 
decided to even look over in the --
A. That's --
Q. — area of the pumps? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. So after the defendant yells that comment to you, 
what do you — what do you and Detective Hanson decide to do? 
A. Well, I looked and there was a — a lady here. She had a 
van and it was parked here facing east. And she was in the 
process of pumping gas. And there were several children in 
the vehicle. 
Q. How many children would you estimate? 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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A. I think there was three, actually. 
Q. And how old were the children, approximately? 
A. Approximately ages ten to six. 
Q. Okay. 
A. (Unintelligible) She — I looked at — when I looked 
over I saw Richard and I saw her and she looked at him and 
she was like — you know, her eyes got big and she seemed to 
hurry and finish pumping her gas. So what I said to 
Detective Hanson was, yeah, let's just ignore him. And we 
continued to walk directly west towards the front doors of 
7-11. 
Q. And did the defendant continue? 
A. Yes. The next thing I heard was extremely loud, even 
louder than the first one, was -- I could say it. 
Q. 
A. 
die 
Q. 
Go a ihead. Why don't you tell us what the 
It was about 
k. 
And, again, 
Detective Hanson 
A. It was, yes. 
Richard, 
Q. 
A. 
And 
She 
hurried 
get 
I said, 
was the 
was, but 
and got 
herself and 
— it was about th ds loud. 
defendant said. 
It was, suck 
was that directed in the direction of you 
7 
We stopped and looked, and 
Richard, you bette 
woman still at the 
then she — when -
in and drove away. 
her kids away from 
>r stop. 
pumps? 
-- when he 
I said to 
my 
and 
said that, she 
I — I assumed it was 
him. 
to 
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Q. Did she have a reaction on her face when she heard the 
defendant again scream? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Objection. Relevance. 
THE COURT: Well, if he saw a reaction I'll allow 
him to describe it. 
A. After that one, I don't know. I didn't — like I said, 
she was hurrying and getting in the car and driving away and 
I was focusing on Mr. Lambeth. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) Okay. So when you are talking to the 
defendant, is he still in this area of the pumps or does he 
ever move? 
A. No, he's still there. 
Q. Okay. While he's in this area and you say to him, you 
need to stop what you're doing — 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. — how does the defendant respond to you? 
A. He yells one more obscenity. 
Q. Okay. As he's yelling that obscenity, are you continuing 
to walk towards the entrance of the store? 
A. I was. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I got right here to the doors and several ladies were 
walking out of 7-11, so the doors were open. 
Q. How many ladies would you estimate? 
A. There was two. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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Q. Okay. 
A. And they were walking out and we — I was like holding 
the door for them to walk out after I had told him, Richard, 
you better stop. And thatfs when he yelled one more time, he 
yells, fuck. 
Q. Okay. And did he yell — did he yell the word "fuck" as 
loud as he had yelled --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- suck my dick? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Did you notice any reaction on the women who were 
coming out the door? 
A. Well, they were kind of like shocked like 
(unintelligible) — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Objection again. Relevance. 
THE COURT: You can describe what you observed. 
A. They -- their eyes got kind of wide and they kind of were 
hesitant to come out because they were like, you know, what's 
going on out here type thing. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) Was it apparent that you were a police 
officer by what you were wearing at that time? 
A. Yeah. I was just like this. 
Q. Okay. So you had a gun on your side and you had a badge, 
A. I had even more. I had a radio and I had handcuffs. 
Q. Okay. And Detective Hanson, was he in any kind of 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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uniform? 
A. He was. 
Q. What was he wearing? 
A. Like -- like this, the gun and badge. He may have had a 
shirt on (unintelligible). I don't recall. 
Q. Okay. But, essentially, plain clothes or with some kind 
of shirt with an insignia, but not like the whole uniform. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. As a result of the defendant then again yelling 
fuck right while you were in the doorway area, what did you 
decide to do? 
A. I decided to talk to Richard and started to walk towards 
him. In the meanwhile, I was radioing some -- a couple of 
other detectives that were just down the street. I told them 
to come and — I told them on the radio that — to come down 
because I was in a situation (unintelligible). I says come 
on down. So they did. And they were only like maybe 30 
seconds out. 
And I walked over to him and he was continuing — I 
don't recall his exact words, but he was continuing. I said, 
Richard, you know, why are you doing this? You know, you 
know we're cops. Why are -- why are you doing this? 
And he said something, and about that time they pulled 
up and I said, he's under arrest. 
Q. What did you place him under arrest for? 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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A. For disorderly conduct. 
Q. Okay. Go ahead and have a seat. 
MS. BEATON: I have no further questions at this 
time. 
THE COURT: Cross? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOUWHUIS: 
Q. Yeah. When you first parked and got out of your 
vehicles, did you notice what Richard was actually doing, 
physically? 
A. I don't recall — I know he was in — in that area of the 
pumps. I believe what he was doing was waiting for this girl 
to pull the car up so he could pump gas into it. 
Q. Okay. So you could see he had a vehicle there with him? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And -- and from all appearances, his standing near a gas 
pump and there was a vehicle there, it appeared to you, would 
it not, that he was waiting to pump gas in his car? 
A. That's what I thought. Yes. 
Okay. Did you see anybody else in his immediate 
vicinity? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Other than the lady pumping gas — 
Right. 
— and the children? No. 
Okay. So nobody -- nobody appeared to be with him. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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A. No. 
Q. Okay. And you were — when you first heard him yelling, 
it was clear to you he was directing his remarks toward you 
and — 
A. I felt like he was since he was looking at me. 
Q. Okay. And it!s your testimony that you have no 
conversation with him at that time prior to his making 
those — those -- yelling those obscenities to you? 
A. None whatsoever. I didn't even see him. 
Q. Okay. So he yells two words at you and then you — you 
and — Officer Hanson was with you at the time? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You continue walking toward the front doors of 7-11? 
A. Yeah. I tell Detective Hanson let's just ignore him, and 
we continue walking. 
Q. Okay. And then when you got to the door, he yelled 
again? 
A. He yelled, suck my dick. 
Q. Okay. And, again, you felt that those remarks were 
directed toward you and Officer Hanson? 
A. I felt like they probably were. 
Q. Okay. Were you looking at him when he said that? 
A. As soon as he started yelling it again I turned and 
looked and saw him — 
Q. And he -- I'm sorry. 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. And he was looking at you? 
A. He was. 
Q. Okay. And then when you opened the door to the store to 
go in, he — he yelled again when the two ladies were walking 
out? 
A. (Inaudible) 
Q. And, again, you feel like those remarks were directed 
toward you; is that correct? 
A. I don't — I can only assume. 
Q. Okay. But certainly -- because you werenft looking at 
him at that time. 
A. No. I was holding the door for the ladies. 
Q. Okay. 
A. They were the ones facing him. 
Q. Did you have any conversations with any other persons at 
that scene who reported that the defendant had been doing 
1 anything prior to your arrival? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. You had no information whatsoever 
presence there prior to your arrival. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Other than the fact that when you pulled 
there. 
A. That's correct. 
regarding his 
up, he was 
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Q. Okay. And so nobody came up to you at any point during 
processing his arrest and the investigation. No one came to 
you and said, by the way, we have other information about 
what he was doing? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So everything youfve told us here, that's --
that's all you observed him do. Is that correct? 
A. Up to the point where I --
Q. Right. 
A. — stopped, yeah. 
Q. Okay. Now, you didn't see him with any weapons during 
this -- this -- what would you call it -- social intercourse? 
A. I wouldn't call it that. 
Q. Okay. But you didn't see him with any weapons; is that 
correct? 
A. No, I didn't see him with any weapons. 
Q. Okay. And you didn't see him running toward you 
aggressively or — 
A. No. 
Q. — otherwise? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And you decide — yet you decide to call for 
backup? 
A. No, I didn't call for backup. I called for somebody to 
transport him, actually, because — 
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Q. Okay. 
A. — I arrested him, but I wanted someone else to transport 
him. 
Q. Okay. I must have misunderstood. I thought you 
testified that you called for backup and then approached the 
defendant. Is that not the correct sequence? 
A. Well, I don't believe I used the word backup. What I 
said was there were several other officers that I knew were 
close by. 
Q. Right. But Ifm talking -- I'm getting at the sequence. 
When did you call for transportation of the defendant? 
A. Just like I said, after the third time and I said to 
Detective Hanson, okay, that's enough. And we started 
walking towards him. I got on the radio and said to the 
other guys, come over here. Richard Lambeth is here. 
Q. Okay. And -- and your --
A. I didn't explain the whole thing on the radio to them. I 
just said, come over here. 
Q. Right. And your intention at that point was you were 
going to arrest him for the obscenities he was using; is that 
correct? 
A. For disorderly conduct. 
Q. Right. Because of the obscenities he was using; is that 
correct? 
A. Well, because of the yelling, the — the disruption to 
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the public, the -- the way that it affected the citizens in 
the area. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What time of the day was this? 
A. 3:45 p.m. 
Q. Okay. And by this time you, obviously, recognized the 
defendant — or the — the suspect or person as Richard 
Lambeth; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And you indicated you had previous dealings with 
him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you say previous — previous dealings, had you 
arrested him before? 
A. I don't believe that I personally have. I think I've 
been present when he was arrested. 
Q. Okay. Was that for drug use? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Nothing further. 
MS. BEATON: I've got a couple of other questions 
although they don't — aren't really rebuttal. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. Did you ever interview the defendant? 
A. Once he was handcuffed and placed in the car, he kept 
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asking to talk to me. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I did finally go talk to him. 
Q. Did you tell him that you did not want to talk to him? 
A. That's correct. I told him several times I didn't want 
to talk to him. 
Q. What did the defendant say, though, when you did go over 
to the car and tell him you did not have any interest in 
talking to him? 
A. He just told me over and over several times that he was 
sorry for what he had done. And I said, well, what did you 
do? 
And he said, I'm sorry for the yelling. 
And I said, no, not — not just the yelling. What did 
you do? 
And he said, I'm sorry for calling you fucking pigs and 
for yelling. 
And I said, not just me. Who did you affect? 
And he said the people around. 
MS. BEATON: I have no further questions. 
State rests. 
THE COURT: Further questions? 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOUWHUIS: 
Q. You took it from that to mean that he recognized his 
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language was offensive? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you found it offensive as well. 
A. I did. 
Q. And you assumed that the people around — speaking of the 
lady and her two children and two ladies coming out of the 
store — you assumed from your observation of them that they 
found his language offensive as well; is that correct? 
A. Based on their reaction, yes. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. 
MS. BEATON: Maybe if I could just follow up. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. Sergeant McAllister, do you think it was the fact that he 
was using swear words and that kind of thing or was it that 
he was yelling? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Objection. That calls for 
speculation. 
THE COURT: Thatfs leading. I'll sustain the 
objection. 
MS. BEATON: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. 
MS. BEATON: State rests, 
THE COURT: All right. Defense wish to present any 
evidence? 
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MR. BOUWHUIS: Just a moment, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, I've advised the defendant of his right to 
testify at this hearing. Also advised him that I don't feel 
it's in his best interest to do so. I don't think his 
testimony would be relevant. And so he's not going to 
testify. We would not submit any evidence. 
THE COURT: All right. Is that correct, 
Mr. Lambeth? You decided not to testify? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Argument? 
MS. BEATON: State will reserve rebuttal. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Your Honor, as I understand it, the 
State's position is that the State would concede that the 
language that was used by the defendant is constitutionally 
protected and that the issue — certainly Brenda will have a 
chance to correct me if I'm wrong, and even if I'm not, I'm 
sure she'll want to get up and say something. 
But my understanding is that's their position is that 
the language the defendant used was constitutionally 
protected, but rather the violation of law came because of 
his way in using it, that he was yelling and disturbing other 
people in the area. 
Our position, Your Honor — and assuming, again, that 
that's what the State's position is, if that's the case 
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then — then we donft really need to get into constitutional 
arguments about what is constitutionally protected — the 
language -- and what isn't, but rather exactly what happened 
in this case. 
I would submit to the Court that based on common sense, 
having heard the evidence and based on the evidence from 
Detective McAllister, that the disturbance as it was observed 
by the officer came from the content of the language that 
Mr. Lambeth was using it rather than the fact that he was 
yelling it. 
I submit that if the defendant were standing out there 
at the gas pump reciting the Pledge of Allegiance or singing 
Mary Had a Little Lamb or whatever, that though people would 
have certainly looked and there may have been some alarm, I 
suspect half of them probably would have laughed at the 
defendant and suspect that he was mentally ill. 
But I think it is important to note, Your Honor, that 
from all the evidence that we have, the defendant was not 
engaging in this behavior prior to the officers1 appearance 
on the scene. He was not directing his remarks toward 
anybody else. This is not a situation where he was parked in 
front of this store protesting the store for some reason and 
causing a -- an elongated or prolonged disturbance here. 
I think it is (unintelligible) to compare this situation 
to the one that Salt Lake City's trying to deal with with the 
I 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
(801) 395-1055 
23 
upcoming conference they've got next week. I think 
everybody's aware of the situation they've had with the 
street preachers standing out in front of crowds and yelling 
their — whatever message it is that they're yelling and 
they're trying to deal with that. 
But — but as you're aware, they haven't — those street 
preachers weren't arrested. Yet they're down there actually 
using language that would incite people to violence and, in 
fact, did on two occasions incite violence. 
We don't have a situation here that's -- that's 
protracted like that. He's obviously there at the gas 
station to put gas in his car. He's not going to be there 
very long. And, in fact, as the officer indicated, he told 
his fellow officer, let's just ignore him. 
And I submit that if they had, in fact, just gone in the 
store and gotten his donuts and left that the defendant's 
behavior would have ceased at that point. 
But while the State will argue that it was the yelling 
and not the content, I submit that in this case, you can't 
really separate the two, that — that if, in fact, you simply 
change the content of what it was Mr. Lambeth was saying that 
the reactions would have been very different from people. 
I'm not saying that that's unreasonable, that that's 
just human nature for people to react that way. Certainly 
the language that he used was not civil in any -- in any 
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manner, it was not genteel, it was not appropriate. And — 
and Ifm not defending that. But the language that he used 
was constitutionally protected. And the fact is, I submit to 
the Court, that there would not have been a confrontation 
with the officers, there would not have been an arrest if, in 
fact, Mr. Lambeth had been saying something else. 
And — and so I submit, Your Honor, that in fact the 
defendant did not commit the offense of disorderly conduct; 
and, therefore, the arrest was illegal. And the subsequent 
search of Mr. Lambeth's person and the seizure of controlled 
substances was also illegal. And, therefore, the evidence 
should be suppressed. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, we're not here to litigate 
whether or not people who are out in front of the LDS Temple 
in Salt Lake, whether or not those sorts of people who are 
protesting and that kind of thing and yelling all sorts of 
things, whether they ought to be charged with disorderly 
conduct. 
What we're dealing with is a situation in the afternoon 
of December 18th. Two officers and some customers are trying 
to just go about their business at 7-11, and instead they 
have to contend with what the defendant is doing at 7-11. 
This isn't about the fact that the defendant used swear 
words. The defendant used some words that weren't even 
J 
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classified as what would be swear words, but he certainly is 
making insulting comments towards the officers and that's — 
that, unfortunately, is what the defendant's going to have to 
deal with. 
But the real issue is — in the disorderly conduct 
provision is whether or not he's becoming disorderly because 
he's creating annoyance or alarm. He's annoying, obviously, 
the police officers, but they're prepared to ignore it and 
they're prepared to go on. 
He's alarming citizens, though, because the officers are 
actually seeing reactions, reactions from the woman who's 
pumping gas who appears to have a reaction to what the 
defendant's saying and so she's hurrying and trying to get 
out of there as soon as possible. 
He's alarming the — the women who are coming outside 
the store, and we're dealing with a public business who's 
trying to conduct business on a regular basis without having 
somebody out in their parking lot yelling and screaming like 
this. 
We're also dealing with the situation where the 
defendant is yelling so loud that the defendant can be heard 
from where the witness stand is all the way out to where the 
railing is out in the middle of the entryway of this 
courthouse. That's how loud this defendant is yelling. And 
the — the defendant continues the yelling even after he's 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
(801) 395-1055 
26 
warned, you need to stop, Mr. Lambeth. 
He doesn't stop. And instead he goes forward and he 
continues. The officers are trying to deal with this as 
low-key as they possibly can, but the fact of the matter is 
the defendant is violating that particular statute because 
he's creating annoyance or alarm and he's creating un — 
unreasonable noises in a public place or unreasonable noises 
in a public -- private place that could be heard in public. 
This is a public parking lot where he's creating these kind 
of noises, and Sergeant McAllister was justified in placing 
the defendant under arrest for that behavior. 
This isn't a situation where he's being punished because 
of the words that he tried to use, although the words were 
offensive and they may have contributed to the alarm. It's 
the fact that the defendant is yelling these things over a 
huge parking lot area that is creating the alarm and the 
annoyance by both the officers and the citizens. 
And we would ask that you determine that this arrest was 
permissible; and, therefore, the search was permissible. 
THE COURT: Well, of course, the courts have been 
very careful to protect speech and protect verbal expression. 
And I agree that that should be done, otherwise, we become 
too oppressive in people's — restricting people's right to 
express themselves. 
I think the state statute, however, is crafted quite 
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carefully as it relates to this wherein it uses the following 
language. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if 
intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, 
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he makes unreasonable 
noises in a public place. 
That — those are the relevant section — provisions in 
the statute. The question isn!t what was said, but the — 
and — and the Court finds that under many circumstances 
those words could certainly be used without being a violation 
of law. 
I think you have to look, however, at the people that 
are impacted by that. For the officers, I think this is 
something they would have to expect and couldnft say, well, 
it caused me alarm or annoyance to the degree that I was 
justified in making an arrest as it relates to them 
individually. 
But the Court does find that there were other persons 
impacted by this — these — this yelling. And a lady right 
in front of him was there when he started screaming out these 
profanities or these -- this language — however you want to 
describe it -- and would, obviously, when looking at the 
situation could see that — anybody could see that he was 
yelling it in a — kind of a confrontational type of manner 
towards the officers. 
And she was, basically, in the middle of this. She was 
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right by him. And I think, clearly, she would have been 
alarmed by this where -- and she had three children in her 
car right — smaller children in the car right next to where 
this type of yelling and confrontational type language was 
being used. 
Then for the officer to tell him to knock it off or to 
stop and to quit doing that, then he yells in a very loud 
word one other obscenity when two women are just walking 
through a door. And I think they very well could have been 
alarmed. 
So I do find that the alarm -- I've often wondered 
whether annoyance is enough when it comes to protected 
speech, but alarm is. I think that's where we get into the 
problem in this case. And I find that there is sufficient 
alarm where a person could reasonably be alarmed by the 
conduct that it — the defendant engaged in. 
So that the — the offense was committed of — or at 
least there's certainly reasonable cause — or probable cause 
to believe an offense committed by the conduct and, 
therefore, the -- the arrest was proper and subsequent search 
then would have been proper -- search incident arrest. 
(Off-the-record discussion) 
THE COURT: And so that is the ruling. Ifm going to 
deny the motion to suppress. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: We need to get a trial date, Your 
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Honor. 
THE COURT: She's calling a telephone conference 
and — if you could wait for a few minutes, but we're — 
MS. BEATON: We can just set it with Diane. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I'll have Diane set it with each 
of you. 
MS. BEATON: Okay. 
THE COURT: And is it a one-day trial then? 
MS. BEATON: It's probably two because it's actually 
a drug case. They found a bunch of drugs and stuff — or not 
a bunch, but they did find drugs. 
THE COURT: Two? Two days? Boy, two days is hard 
to find. 
THE CLERK: 
THE COURT: 
THE CLERK: 
in the same boat. 
THE COURT: 
conference now? 
THE CLERK: Yeah. Do you want me to start it? 
THE COURT: Let's go ahead and get that — we're a 
half — (video goes off momentarily). 
(Video begins) — but I'm not going to give further O.R. 
on it. I try, but there was — 
THE DEFENDANT: All right. Thank you 
So is one. 
So is one. 
So I don't — I think we're going to be 
But are we starting the telephone 
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(unintelligible). 
THE COURT: I think it was because of your record, 
THE DEFENDANT: All right. 
(Proceedings conclude) 
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